Afghan War Reenactment and BMP Demonstration Run

Opening of guided-tour and interactive areas to visitors:

• “Stalin Line” Guided Tour Route
• “Our Armoured Train” Exhibition
• Operational Military Vehicle Display
• Photo Area
• Shooting from a tank and gun**
• Blank-Firing Weapons Shooting**

Ready for Labour and Defence (GTO) These are interactive entertainment areas.

Everyone taking part in the Stalin Line GTO Challenge Area can enter the prize draw.

To enter the prize draw, you must:

• Complete all GTO areas and receive a score for each one
• Arrive at the specified time for the announcement of the prize-draw results
• Certificates and prizes will be awarded exclusively to participants who attend the prize-giving ceremony.

Main GTO areas:

• Airgun Shooting






• Weapon Assembly and Disassembly






• Scout Trail






• Historical Quiz






• Grenade Throwing






• Artillery School

In accordance with the reform plan for the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus, and to improve the security of military facilities belonging to Armed Forces units and institutions, the 1st Military School for Junior Specialists (Service Dog Training) was established in 1993. Now the Armed Forces Canine Centre, it is based in Krupki, Minsk Region. Its official date of establishment is 16 November 1993, when the first school order was issued.

In 1995, recognising the importance and potential for the development of military working dog training, a decision was made to relocate the Armed Forces Canine Centre to the settlement of Kolodishchi, Minsk District.

Since the centre was established, it has trained more than three thousand service dogs and over three thousand military working dog specialists.

Today, the Armed Forces Canine Centre is a military training unit responsible for training military working dog specialists and service dogs for a variety of roles, including mine detection, search and rescue, tracking, the detection of weapons, narcotics and explosives, guard duties, patrol work and others.

The centre devotes considerable attention to breeding and dog shows. More than 500 dogs and puppies have taken part in national and international shows.

The centre’s dogs hold titles including International Champion, Candidate for International Champion, Champion of Belarus, Candidate for Champion of Belarus, class winner and FCI group winner.

The Canine Centre plays an active role in the military-patriotic education of schoolchildren and in enhancing the prestige of military service. To this end, the centre’s personnel give demonstrations, conduct informative guided tours and take part in other civic and patriotic events.

Since the centre was established, there has not been a single breach of any facility guarded by service dogs trained there.

The highly mobile nature of combat operations conducted by the limited contingent of Soviet troops across the vast expanses of Afghanistan, together with the constant need to supply it from the USSR with military equipment and goods for the civilian economy, resulted in large-scale convoy movements. These convoys were convenient targets for enemy attacks. Their high vulnerability was due to the poorly developed road network, much of which ran through mountainous terrain. Narrow mountain roads with numerous hairpin bends and tight turning radii often made it impossible for vehicles travelling in opposite directions to pass. At times, they could not accommodate convoys at all without special measures being taken.
The main road network consisted of the Kabul–Pul-e Khumri–Sheberghan–Herat–Kandahar–Kabul ring road and seven roads branching off it, with narrow passages leading to high mountain passes and the borders of neighbouring countries. The most difficult section of the Termez–Kabul road crossed the Hindu Kush mountain range and its high-altitude passes, including the Salang Pass, situated at an altitude of approximately 4 km. The pass is equipped with a system of galleries and the world’s highest-altitude tunnel, which is over 2.5 km long, while the total length of the covered gallery exceeds 6 km.
Sharp bends, climbs and descents seriously impeded the movement of vehicle convoys along the roads. For example, the ascent and descent over the Salang Pass extended for 80–100 km. Most sections of the road were exposed to rockfalls, landslides and falling stones, as well as snow avalanches and blockages in winter. During winter, steep gradients and descents, sometimes combined with ice, made most mountain-pass sections of the roads difficult to negotiate, particularly for wheeled vehicles. Mountain rivers also posed a major obstacle to vehicles, as they became virtually impossible to ford during floods.
The opposition forces’ tactics on the roads were based on small detachments and groups carrying out surprise attacks on vehicle convoys, most often in the ‘green zone’. Along convoy routes, the insurgents laid mines and damaged individual sections of road by digging transverse trenches and ditches or artificially narrowing the carriageway. They also scattered sharp objects and sometimes overturned heavy goods vehicles on the roads.
The enemy attached particular importance to laying mine and explosive obstacles on the roads. A wide variety of mining techniques and methods were employed. Mines were most commonly laid on sections of road, at road structures and in places suitable for accommodating and resting personnel. Individual anti-tank (anti-vehicle) mines and demolition charges were placed at locations where the destruction of a vehicle would halt traffic for a prolonged period and create favourable conditions for attacking personnel and vehicles from ambush. Ambush groups ranged from 10–15 to 100–150 men. When selecting an ambush site, they made skilful use of the terrain, including gorges, defiles, mountain passes, ledges above the road and galleries. Positions were generally prepared in advance and concealed on mountain slopes or ridgelines, at the entrances to or exits from gorges, on mountain-pass sections of roads and at places where Soviet drivers were likely to rest.
Ambush personnel were positioned along the road, 150–300 m from it, usually at intervals of 25–40 m. One of the enemy’s favoured tactics was to strike simultaneously at the head and rear of a convoy, targeting fuel tankers first. Meanwhile, snipers directed aimed fire at the senior personnel in each vehicle in order to disrupt command and control. One set of instructions smuggled into Afghanistan from abroad stated: ‘Question: “When and where is it best to attack a convoy?” Answer: “The most suitable places are at tunnel entrances and exits, near bridges, at sharp bends, on climbs and descents, and where roads narrow.”’
These were the tactics encountered by troops tasked with guiding and escorting convoys. Initially, they had no experience of carrying out such duties. They had to acquire it under combat conditions, sometimes suffering needless losses.
(The Afghan War: Combat Operations, by Valentin Alexandrovich Runov)
We invite you, our dear guests, to witness an episode commemorating the heroism of military drivers, motorised rifle troops from convoy escort and security units and, of course, the Airborne Forces personnel who always came to the aid of convoys in distress.

Two crews in two BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicles will take part in the demonstration run.
The total distance is approximately 2 km, including obstacles and two shooting exercises.
Crew: driver-mechanic, gunner-operator and combat vehicle commander.
Obstacles:
1. A challenging, narrow and winding course.
2. Pit.
3. Ramp.
4. Hill.
5. Fence between buildings.
6. Embarkation and disembarkation of a 12-person infantry squad. Two simulated firing exercises: with the 73 mm Grom gun and the turret-mounted PKT machine gun, supporting infantry operations during the capture of a building and while moving along the course.